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  8. The Mystique of “Cyberwar” and the Strategic Latency of 
Networked Social Movements 
David Betz 
 
Cyberspace has come a long way since the science-fiction writer William Gibson coined the term in 
his 1982 short story, ‘Burning Chrome’. Of his creation, Gibson later said, ‘it seemed like an 
effective buzzword ... evocative and essentially meaningless. It was suggestive but had no real 
semantic meaning, even for me.’1 Few now could doubt the effectiveness of cyberspace as a 
buzzword. Many happy research grant holders can attest to the near-magical powers the cyber-prefix 
has over funding agencies. It is evocative, to be sure, but what does it actually mean for strategists 
concerned with the balancing of ends, ways, and means in conflict today? How useful is it for 
understanding global trends and the future of warfare?  
History can tell us two things about the past, which may help us understand the present. First, the 
essential strategic dilemma today is not merely adaptation to technical change—the advent of the 
‘Information Age’, though this is important; rather it is the same diminishing decisiveness of major 
war, for a mixture of political, economic and technological reasons, that has vexed generations of 
strategists, not merely our own. Second, contemporary strategists who reckon, for reasons including 
the technical difficulties of attribution in cyberspace, that ‘cyberwar’ is a decisive new form of 
conflict are wrong. Meanwhile, social science can tell us something about new power actors 
emerging in transnational space that strategists need to comprehend better, because digital 
connectivity is imbuing novel globally networked social movements—some egregiously violent and 
politically-orientated, others instrumentally-violent and profit-oriented, most politically-oriented and 
non- (or trivially) violent—with a strategic significance not seen by non-state actors in the Western 
world since 1648.  
Before we begin, a caveat and a few words of context are necessary. First, on the whole, in this 
paper I adopt the self–conscious tone of the historian ever sensitive to the continuity of events as 
opposed to their change. Having said that, though, I also believe that we are as a species near to a 
genuine discontinuity, which some scientists have described as ‘The Singularity’—the point at which 
human intelligence is surpassed by machine intelligence.2 Afterwards, whether we merge with our 
digital offspring, are massacred by them, or kept as reverend ancestors, or much-loved pets, there is 
no point speculating about war (or anything else); until then, however, war will remain as it ever 
was—an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will, if you prefer Clausewitz, or the collective 
action of a group of men to realize their own will even against the resistance of another group, if you 
prefer Weber.3  
Second, no one would deny the awesome opportunities for business, governments, and citizens that 
the unparalleled advancement of digital interconnectivity in recent decades has brought with it—
cyberspace penetrates nearly every aspect of our lives, how we work, entertain ourselves, consume, 
maintain friendships, find spiritual sustenance, educate ourselves, and participate in civic life as free 
citizens. Indeed, so deep and multi-layered is the interpenetration of the 'real world' by the 'digital 
world' that it is increasingly nonsensical to speak of the two as distinct and separate. Clay Shirky puts 
it this way, ‘The old view of online as a separate space, cyberspace apart from the real world… the 
whole notion of cyberspace is fading. [Cyberspace is not] an alternative to real life, [it is] part of it.’4 
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 As individuals we inhabit both worlds simultaneously, and the same is true for governments, 
industries, and practically every other collective social entity. Truly, 'The Matrix is everywhere.'  
Naturally, there is an anxiety surrounding the concept of cyberspace, which is predictable. In the late 
1960s Marshall McLuhan, drawing on Søren Kierkegaard’s 1844 book The Concept of Dread, observed 
that ‘wherever a new environment goes around an old one there is always new terror.’5 It is not hard 
to find evidence today of a 'new terror'. It is splashed across the pages of newspapers and the covers 
of popular books where all manner of cyber-prefixed threats from ‘cyberespionage’ and ‘cyberterror’ 
to ‘cyberwar’ and even ‘cybergeddon’ are proclaimed; and these in turn engender other cyber-
prefixed neologisms such as ‘cybersecurity’, ‘cyberpower’ and ‘cyberstrategy’ in response. It is also to 
be found in the stated strategic apprehensions of many major governments. The title and foreword 
of Britain’s new National Security Strategy, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty, provides a perfect 
example of this: 
Britain today is both more secure and more vulnerable than in most of her long 
history. More secure, in the sense that we do not currently face, as we have so often 
in our past, a conventional threat of attack on our territory by a hostile power. But 
more vulnerable, because we are one of the most open societies, in a world that is 
more networked than ever before.6 
Britain is not peculiarly subject to this paradox of conventional physical security being matched by a 
sense of unconventional insecurity—the same sentiment pervades American strategic writings such 
as the latest Quadrennial Defense Review and, no doubt, the governments of most other major 
countries.7 Networked societies now perceive that they face threats which previous societal forms 
did not, including the vulnerability of critical national infrastructures to cyberattack, the potential 
enervation of their economies through cyberespionage and cybercrime, and the consequent 
endangerment of the lives, property, and well-being of their citizens. McLuhan was essentially 
correct: whatever the technology in question, eventually the ‘shock of the new’ tends, in time, to be 
absorbed and normalized. This is not to deny the transformative effects of technology, but it is 
important, as strategists, to maintain a degree of perspective on events and processes that at close 
hand appear as existential threats yet with respectful distance and consideration take on different 
hues. 
 
Some Things Change, Some Stay the Same 
If you want to understand what is happening in 2011 it is worth pausing for thought about the world 
as it seemed in 1911 because there is more than a passing resemblance between the first parts of the 
20th and 21st centuries. There is today a similar technological surge—the 19th was known as the 
century of invention for good reason; a similarly political revolutionary climate prevails in which les 
anciens regimes are the target of substantial subversion and political violence; and there is a similar 
popular feeling that the international order is shifting in some potentially tectonic way.  
The present is always shaped by many forces, often deep historical processes—political, social, 
economic, demographic, climatic and so on—but there can be little doubt that this particular 
moment is powerfully affected by a recent and radical change in the modality of communications 
which many regard as the dawning of an ‘Information Age’. ‘The Web is shifting power in ways that 
we could never have imagined’, claimed a recent BBC television documentary on cyberspace called 
The Virtual Revolution:  
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 With two billion people online the Web is holding governments to account, 
uncovering injustices, and accelerating globalisation. It’s providing us with new 
allegiances but it’s also reinventing warfare.8 
Leave aside for the time being whether or not this is true and consider where have we heard such 
claims before, particularly in respect to changes in warfare? In fact, they were wearyingly typical of 
the airpower theorists in Europe and the United States in the first decades of the 20th century. As 
Michael Sherry commented on early speculations about the 'age of flight' in his masterful history The 
Rise of American Air Power,  
Because prophecy necessarily leaped ahead of technology, it often read like fanciful 
or bloodless abstractions, as if designed, like science fiction, less to depict future 
dangers than to express current anxieties.9 
The bomber will always get through…', warned Stanley Baldwin in a famous House of Commons 
speech in November 1932 entitled ‘A Fear for the Future’.10 The prophets of airpower writing in the 
shadow of the Great War's ghastly yet indecisive slaughters were convinced of the power of aerial 
warfare to deliver big results fast. In one of his worst books, The Reformation of War, published in 
1923, the British strategist J.F.C. Fuller invited his readers to... 
Picture if you can what the result [of a mass aerial attack] will be: London for several 
days will be one vast raving Bedlam, the hospitals will be stormed, traffic will cease, 
the homeless will shriek for help, the city will be in pandemonium. What of the 
government at Westminster? It will be swept away by an avalanche of terror. Then 
will the enemy dictate his terms, which will be grasped at like a straw by a drowning 
man. Thus may a war be fought in forty-eight hours and the losses of the winning 
side may be actually nil!11 
It was not merely the apparent puissance of the new means of warfare that anchored the beliefs of 
airpower theorists in its decisiveness; equally important was their acute sense of the fragility of 
modern industrial society. In the 1920s and 1930s there was profound worry in Europe that the 
economic achievements in which they gloried—industrial power and material and cultural wealth—
also made them hopelessly vulnerable to attack on the home front. Consider the language of another 
British strategist Basil Liddell-Hart, also writing in the 1920s about the power of aerial 
bombardment to leap over a country’s surface fortifications and attack its innards directly:  
A nation’s nerve system, no longer covered by the flesh of its troops is now laid bare 
to attack, and, like the human nerves, the progress of civilization has rendered it far 
more sensitive than in earlier and more primitive times.12 
This is not to beg the question that bombs and bandwidth are the same or equivalent things, or that 
what was true or not true of airpower need necessarily be the same of its cyberspace analogue. Yet 
there are some lessons that we might take from the debates over airpower in the early part of the 
previous century. Perhaps the most germane of these is the fact that airpower never lived up to the 
dreams of its most enthusiastic boosters. There certainly is no denying the enormous contribution of 
it to modern warfare; but what never materialized was the ability to achieve independent war-winning 
effects—winning the war in forty-eight hours without casualties on the victorious side, as Fuller 
imagined, and as other prophets of airpower claimed too. 
Another lesson is to be cautious of experts in epaulettes whose vision may be more clouded by 
internal bureaucratic positioning than ‘non-expert’ outsiders. For instance, in 1908 the science 
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 fiction author H.G. Wells painted in his book The War in the Air a picture of the effects of airpower 
on war, which was essentially ambivalent if not dystopian. He got much of the detail wrong, often 
comically so—his war in the air was fought by vast fleets of Zeppelins, ground-based lightning 
cannons, and ‘Asiatic’ flying machines propelled by flapping wings.13 More important though was 
that he got the big picture right: his conclusion, written just five years after the first flight of the 
Wright brothers at Kitty Hawk, was that aerial warfare would be ‘at once enormously destructive 
and entirely indecisive.’ Compare this with the musings of the ‘father of the USAF’ Billy Mitchell 
whose thoughts on airpower’s significance by 1930 were utterly unequivocal and distinctly utopian: it 
was ‘a distinct move for the betterment of civilization, because wars will be decided quickly and not 
drag on for years.’14 Whose vision was the clearer? Old adages of missing the forest for the trees 
should spring to mind. 
Finally, we should bear in mind Eliot Cohen's sage observation that ‘air power is an unusually 
seductive form of military strength, in part because, like modern courtship, it appears to offer 
gratification without commitment.’15 The fundamental characteristics of airpower are said to be: 
speed—a function of the lack of obstacles in air space which makes airpower highly responsive; 
range—a function of the ubiquity of the atmosphere which means airpower is highly mobile; and, 
elevation—a function of the depth of the air space which means airpower possesses a wide perspective 
on the conflict below. Cyberpower appears to offer similar things, only more so, which makes it a 
very sexy concept indeed. 
 
The Siren Song of the Cyber Prophets 
In fact, cyberpower offers other things too which airpower does not: anonymity—a function of the 
architecture of cyberspace;16 and low ‘buy-in costs’—a function of the ubiquity of digital networks and 
the prevalence of cheap consumer electronics. These attributes alarm experts in epaulettes. They are 
the key factors that underpin most of the ‘cyber-doomsday’ or ‘electronic Pearl Harbour’ scenarios 
which, hyperbolic as they may be, are certainly rhetorically effective. Take, for instance, the 
conclusion to James Adams’ 1998 book The Next World War, one of the earliest popular treatments 
of cyberwar, ‘As David proved against Goliath, strength can be beaten. America today looks 
uncomfortably like Goliath, arrogant in its power, armed to the teeth, ignorant of its weakness.’17 Or 
as it was put in a recent article in Joint Forces Quarterly:  
One reason for the imminent and broad-based nature of the cyberspace challenge is 
the low buy-in cost compared to the vastly more complex and expensive 
appurtenances of air and space warfare, along with the growing ability of present and 
prospective Lilliputian adversaries to generate what one expert called ‘catastrophic 
cascading effects’ through asymmetric operations against the American Gulliver.18 
Pick your metaphor, Goliath and David or Gulliver and the Lilliputians, the point is that cyberspace 
is regarded as potentially very disruptive of the existing asymmetry of power between the United 
States and its state competitors. In Richard Clarke’s recent book Cyberwar he describes a cyberattack 
on the United States that is utterly devastating: 
In all the wars America has fought, no nation has ever done this kind of damage to 
our cities. A sophisticated cyber war attack by one of several nation-states could do 
that today, in fifteen minutes, without a single terrorist or soldier ever appearing in 
this country.19 
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 But then in a further twist he adds the kicker—because of the inherent identity-obscuring effect of 
the Web… 
In cyber war, we may never even know what hit us. Indeed, it may give little solace 
to Americans shivering without power to know that the United States may be about 
to retaliate in kind. 
‘While you were on the line with the President, sir, Cyber Command called from 
Fort Meade. They think the attack came from Russia and they are ready to turn out 
the lights in Moscow, sir. Or maybe it was China, so they are ready to hit Beijing, if 
you want to do that. Sir?’20 
Indubitably, this is a scary scenario. However, is it not the same thing we observed with the 
prophets of airpower? Consider what Liddell-Hart said about the ‘nervous system’ of the country 
laid bare to attack then look at the apprehensions expressed in the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace 
from 2003:  
Our nation’s critical infrastructures are composed of… [a very long list of assets 
beginning with ‘public and private institutions’ and ending with ‘postal and 
shipping’]. Cyberspace is their nervous system—the control system of our country.21  
Of course it is possible that what was not true of airpower three quarters of a century ago may be 
true of cyberpower now; that said, again, reason would suggest some caution about the decisiveness 
of this new means, to which we shall return. First, however, it is important to point out that the 
‘attribution problem’ is not simply a problem; in fact, viewed from another perspective, it is the 
veritable Holy Grail of strategic calculation because it appears to solve an underlying strategic 
problem which has been bothering us for years: how to restore elusive decision in major war. If the 
identity of an attacker via cyberspace is unknown then retaliation is difficult—and perhaps, 
therefore, the process of escalation inherent to war that has largely held back major war since 1945 
might not be engaged. In short, cyberpower is even more seductive than airpower, in part because it 
appears to offer gratification without the need of any physical connection, let alone commitment, to 
other human beings whatsoever. 
This is not to diminish the ‘attribution problem’, which is quite obviously exploited by hackers and 
criminals who, as it states in USAF doctrine on Cyberspace Operations, constantly ‘amaze those in 
global law enforcement with the speed at which they stay one step ahead in the technology race.’22 It 
is to suggest that the attribution problem is really something which pertains to those activities, to law 
enforcement and to counter-espionage, because war is different. The false allure of ‘cyberwar’ lies in 
the notion that it provides a sneaky way to reassert decision in the context of major war. But when 
states use cyberpower against other states for the purposes of compelling them to do their will they 
still have to declare what it is (even if after the event). Anonymity is as much a problem for the 
strategic aggressor as it is the defender: how do you compel your enemy to do your will if you do 
not communicate it? To whom does the victim either submit or render ‘cash payment’, as Clausewitz 
put it? 
There is no sneaky way around this problem. If China were to kill several thousands of Americans, 
or vice versa, and profoundly disrupt the lives of many millions of others through cyberattack in an 
attempt to bend its government to its will then the prefix cyber would be superfluous to the 
requirement of describing the state of relations which would exist between the two countries. 
‘Cyberwar’ as a ‘pure play’ option for states is unrealistic because of the expanse and diversity of 
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 their interests and capabilities. As strategists we should be demanding that our colleagues show more 
discipline in their use of the term ‘war’. 
What of the alleged ‘low buy-in’ costs of cyberwar? Recent events do not lend credence to this idea, 
at least for the time being. To be sure, the physical instruments of a cyberattack are dirt–cheap. The 
Stuxnet virus which targeted the Iranian nuclear program accomplished relatively cleanly what a large 
air force might have struggled to do messily, and it fit comfortably in a ‘corner’ of a twenty dollar 
data stick. According to the best recent reporting Stuxnet was designed by the United States and 
Israel with the assistance, witting or otherwise, of Britain and Germany. Much attention has been 
paid to the remarkable sophistication of the weapon. For the purposes at hand, however, the 
significant thing about Stuxnet (which in historical perspective may be seen as the Zeppelin bomber 
of its day) is that its design required a large amount of high-grade intelligence about its intended 
target in order to work. It was not, according to experts who have analysed it, the work of hackers 
alone: 
It had to be the work of someone who knew his way around the specific quirks of 
the Siemens controllers and had an intimate understanding of exactly how the 
Iranians had designed their enrichment operations. In fact, the Americans and the 
Israelis had a pretty good idea.23  
In short, as with all other weapons systems (with the exception of the hydrogen bomb, arguably) it 
required the combination of significant other resources in order to achieve strategic effect. 
Moreover, far from demonstrating a smoothing of the existing asymmetry of power it actually shows 
a reinforcement of that asymmetry: cyberpower rewards already powerful states with even more 
capability and, when push comes to shove, it would appear that Western powers have thought hard 
about cyberattack and are pretty good at it. 
Again, a comparison to airpower is apt. Virtually unchallenged air supremacy and air-ground 
coordination has become more or less the sine qua non of the Western ‘way of war’; or what in his 
book Military Power Stephen Biddle described, in slightly different terms, as the ‘modern system’ of 
warfare—a system which, not incidentally, he claims was born in the tactical conditions of the First 
World War.24 The advent of the ‘modern system’ caused a bifurcation of military power between 
armies that ‘got it’ and armies that did not—with the latter being soundly thrashed by the former 
even when they possessed the same, or similar, weapons and numerical superiority.  
A similar process is likely with respect to cyberpower. Armies which are able to defend their 
networks will accrue distinct advantages from ‘network-enabling’ them, while armies that do not 
possess such ability will not enjoy any such advantage—and they will be punished harshly for trying 
to ‘network-enable’ practically anything. It is worth recalling that the seminal 1993 article by John 
Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, ‘Cyberwar is Coming!’ which set off this debate, in contrast with the 
extant literature on cyberwar, was essentially tactical in orientation: 
Small numbers of your light, highly mobile forces defeat and compel the surrender 
of large masses of heavily armed, dug-in enemy forces, with little loss of life on either 
side. Your forces can do this because they are well prepared, make room for 
manoeuvre, concentrate their firepower rapidly in unexpected places, and have 
superior command, control, and information systems that are decentralized to allow 
tactical initiatives, yet provide the central commanders with unparalleled intelligence 
and ‘topsight’ for strategic purposes.25  
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 It was a vision about moving and shooting more adroitly than your opponent through the 
employment of better information systems—knowledge as power in a very literal and immediate 
sense. Military cyberpower is a real and important compliment to other military capabilities—it does 
not, as airpower did not, obviate those capabilities or change the objective nature of war.  
 
World of Warcraft  
The last word on cyberpower could easily go to H.G. Wells, who described airpower with the very 
apposite phrase: ‘neither unthinkable nor blessed.’ Except actually that will not suffice, for while it is 
true that in military terms cyberspace changes less than is often supposed, there is actually 
something significant happening today as a result of digital connectivity of which strategists should 
take account—just not in the frame of interstate war. A few years ago the British general Rupert 
Smith wrote in his book The Utility of Force, that “…war as cognitively known to most non-
combatants, war as battle in a field between men and machinery, war as a massive deciding event in 
a dispute in international affairs: such war no longer exists.”26 Smith goes way out on a limb here, 
but he has quite a lot of company perched on the branch alongside him, including the likes of 
Martin Van Creveld, Michael Mandelbaum, and most famously Norman Angell who wrote 100 years 
ago in The Great Illusion,  
…the believer in war justifies his dogmatism for the most part by an appeal to what 
he alleges is the one dominating fact of the situation—i.e., that human nature is 
unchanging. [but] Human nature is changing out of all recognition. Not only is man 
fighting less, but he is using all forms of physical compulsion less, and as a very 
natural result is losing those psychological attributes that go with the employment of 
physical force. And he is coming to employ physical force less because accumulated 
evidence is pushing him more and more to the conclusion that he can accomplish 
more easily that which he strives for by other means.27  
Angell was wrong then, as the two world wars that followed within a generation showed with tragic 
force (Smith may be wrong now). Nonetheless, the belief in major war’s obsolescence has proved 
extremely persistent and has many current adherents—including the preeminent historian of the 
First World War, Hew Strachan, who observed recently that ‘the pole around which our ideas of war 
cluster should no longer be major war, itself a theoretical construct derived from the Second World 
War and scarcely encountered in reality since.’28 Moreover, the ideal of ‘war by other means’ which 
Adams claimed ‘cyberwar’ would bring has hardly lost its appeal for a minute since Sun Tzu 
immortalized it more than 2,500 years ago. 
Let us assume for purposes of argument that the long sought ideal is now a reality. This raises a 
question: if the skein of human history is no longer spun so much from threads of khaki, olive 
green, and field grey then from what is it spun, for surely, contra Angell, it is not because we have 
become all of a sudden more agreeable and less disputatious as a species by nature? My answer: 
wizards and demons. It sounds funny but is meant only somewhat playfully; in fact, it is based upon 
standard projection of well-established technological and social trends which are causing the 
emergence of networked social movements with an increasing ability to cause large economic, 
political, and security effects.  
Arthur C. Clarke, scientist, science fiction author and one of the most cautious and accurate 
futurists, offered three ‘laws’ of prediction. The third of these states ‘Any sufficiently advanced 
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 technology is indistinguishable from magic.’29 Our society is utterly suffused with technology, 
especially information technology, which the vast majority of us use for all intents and purposes as if 
they were magical artefacts: people consult Google the way the Greeks did the Oracle of Delphi; 
they use the ‘appear offline’ setting on MSN Messenger to be invisible to other ‘Netizens’ in the 
same way Frodo Baggins used the One Ring; there is a long-running gag on the comedy programme 
Little Britain which rests on the finality of the phrase ‘Computer says no’ (usually voiced by an 
uncaring travel agent or petty bureaucrat) as though like the judgments of Solomon there was no 
higher authority in this world than the impersonal net.  
There is scene in Daniel Suarez’s novel Freedom™, the sequel to Daemon—a near-future/alternate 
present depiction of a world in which a distributed, narrow artificial intelligence (the eponymous 
Daemon), created by a dying multi-billionaire computer game designer, radically reshapes society 
though manipulation of the network flows on which it depends, which illustrates this convergence 
of technology and magic perfectly.30 In this scene the book’s hero meets his ‘spiritual guide,’ who 
explains to him the workings of the ‘darknet’—the system created by the Daemon, which blends both 
the virtual and the ‘real’ worlds—and the quest on which he has been set: 
Where ancient people believed in gods and devils that listened to their pleas and 
curses—in this age immortal entities hear us. Call them bots or spirits; there is no 
functional difference now. They surround us and through them word-forms become 
an unlock code that can trigger a blessing or a curse. Mankind created systems whose 
inter-reactions we could not fully understand, and the spirits we have gathered have 
escaped from them into the land where they walk the earth—or the GPS grid, 
whichever you prefer. The spirit world overlaps the real one now, and our lives will 
never be the same.31 
Aside from the use of the words ‘spirit world’ instead of ‘cyberspace’ is there any difference between 
Suarez’s notion that ‘the spirit world overlaps the real one’ and Clay Shirky’s argument that the 
distinction between cyberspace and the real world is fading to irrelevance? Given Gibson’s 
acknowledgement of the semantic emptiness of the term cyberspace why should we be precious 
about it? The truth is that relatively few people understand how our new hybrid reality of ‘real’ space 
and cyberspace is constructed—they do not see the ‘Matrix’ in its raw code. In itself, this is a bland 
observation; the elite in all societal forms throughout history has always been composed in part by 
those who, in Marxist terms, were most au fait with the ‘dominant means of production’: 
Technology does not invent, install, or maintain itself, but needs human beings to 
bring it out into production. It is thus not the technology that matters but the human 
skill and social organization that lie behind it. In other words, it is the professional 
experts who have constructed the system, which in turn has created them.32  
It leads to an important question, however, which is that if cyberspace is generating a new social 
morphology in the form of the ‘network society’ then what is the nature of the new elite? 
Presumably a part of it will be composed of those with greater than normal ability to delve between 
the layers of hardware and software from which the ‘physical’ and ‘syntactic’ layers of cyberspace are 
constructed.33 In the early 1970s Daniel Bell in The Coming of Post-Industrial Society predicted 
something like this when he wrote of the emergence of ‘technical elites’.34 We could as well call them 
wizards—magic adepts, not magic in the sense of sleight of hand, but magic in the sense of being 
able to cause real world change through what seems to the non-adept as the casting of spells and 
invocations issued in arcane languages.  
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 From a security perspective, however, whatever we call the new elite, it must be recognized that it 
includes hackers. This is important for as Tim Jordan pointed out in his 1999 book Cyberpower: 
Hackers are some of the most dedicated and powerful inhabitants of cyberspace and 
their ability to act in cyberspace is defined almost entirely by their expertise. There 
are numerous examples of hackers using astonishingly outdated equipment to 
control the most powerful resources of cyberspace. After all, telecommunications 
does not need a powerful computer and a simple machine can control a powerful 
one. Hackers demonstrate the extreme end of the technopower elite, where material 
resources are close to zero, though never actually zero, and expertise is 
monumental.35 
In other words, hackers are a superb example of the phenomenon which software entrepreneur cum 
strategist John Robb describes as ‘super-empowerment’.36 However, we must be wary of 
generalization about them. The term ‘hacker’ itself is contested and has transformed over time from 
a term of respect to one more often of opprobrium; and the hacker community is populated by 
multitudinous subgroups that vary in aim, motivation, and profile. Sociological profiles of the 
hacking community are few and far between and inherently hard to keep up to date owing in part to 
its amorphousness, ambiguous legality, and predilection to identity-obscuring noms de guerre. Hackers 
are typically positioned in terms of male youth culture, disaffection, and rebelliousness, though this 
is more a stereotype of one segment of the community than a valid generalization of the community 
as a whole. One way of typologizing hackers is to adopt an evolutionary model with different 
‘animals’ branching off a common ancestor:  
• 1st evolution (from 1960s–70s): creative programmers usually working in academic institutions 
on mainframe computers, ethical computer ‘gurus’, e.g., MIT/Stanford; 
• 2nd evolution (from 1970s–80s): computer entrepreneurs involved in the shift from mainframe 
to personal computing, founding major computer companies and digital communities, e.g., 
Apple, The WELL; 
• 3rd evolution (from 1990s): copyright breakers using the web for file sharing largely for 
entertainment rather than profit, e.g., Napster, Pirate Bay, etc; 
• 4th evolution (from 1990s): criminals and ‘cyberpunks’ hacking for profit or ‘cyber-vandalism’ 
done for ‘lulz’ (fun). 
An important trend extracted from this typology is that hacking has become more objectively 
purposeful over time. The first evolution of hackers appears to have been interested in 
programming mainly for its own sake—their main preoccupation was to achieve total mastery of 
their machines, which were very limited devices, and to produce elegant code. Their milieu was 
largely academic and scientific—a small community of highly intelligent people trying to get the 
most out of relatively dumb machines. Subsequent evolutions of hackers appear, while not 
necessarily losing a love of good code, to be more interested in computing for profit (legitimate or 
otherwise) or fun (harmless or not). Another trend is the decrease in average skill level as the 
community has burgeoned with ‘script kiddies’ hacking with sophisticated software written by more 
technically-skilled others. Ultimately, their milieu is more broadly societal and mainstream—a large 
group of relatively unskilled people entertaining or enriching themselves with ever more powerful 
machines and sophisticated software. 
These trends are suggestive. Might the next evolution be hacking for politically subversive or 
revolutionary purpose? Does cyberspace create a ‘niche’ in the strategic realm that has not existed 
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 before for spatially disaggregated, materially weak, but high–expertise actors (groups, possibly 
individuals, and plausibly the software alone) to exert strategic effect? Perhaps, as with Wells’ War in 
the Air, science fiction has something to tell us. Suarez’s novels are a good place to start. Certainly, 
they are ‘ripping yarns’ full of cinematic touches such as robotic samurai-sword wielding 
motorcycles, and the plot unfolds in a sequence of ever larger and more violent car crashes. But they 
are more than that too. For one thing, the Daemon behaves in a strategically sound manner as a true 
Clausewitzean bent on compelling its powerful enemies—corporations and powerful financiers 
primarily, government agencies secondarily—to do its will through an admixture of means, including 
force applied by its various agents, both human and robotic. For another, there are no grossly 
implausible details in the technology described. As the author put it,  
The Daemon is, of course, fiction, but our world is increasingly automated, 
interconnected, and data-driven. Narrow artificial intelligence bots already make life-
changing decisions about and for large segments of the human population... These 
proprietary systems alter human behaviour as we strive to improve or maintain our 
scores within their framework—in much the same way players are driven to reach 
higher levels in games... As long as they are profitable, these systems eventually 
become institutions unto themselves, attended by a caste of high-tech priests who 
alone know their dark mysteries.37 
Moreover, the books’ appeal goes beyond those interested in mere techno-thrills. Indeed, the books 
can be read less as thrillers than as extended essays on sustainable economy, ‘eco-pragmatism’, and a 
new form of politics based upon massively parallel activism—punctuated by the occasional fiery car 
crash. In them the power of the network is normatively neutral while having the potential to be 
oppressive or liberating—neither ‘unthinkable or blessed’ as H.G. Wells might have said, and the 
‘wizards’ with the technical nous to exploit it can do so constructively or parasitically. In other 
words, the Daemon is not a true artificial intelligence; it does not possess the wherewithal to care one 
way or the other what humanity does with its new power—heaven or hell, the choice is ours. The 
point here is not whether Suarez’s imaginings are correct in detail—surely they are not; but whether, 
like Wells, he is capturing the big picture in ways that strategists should take on board. Considered 
from the perspective of ends, ways and means there is some ‘real world’ evidence, as yet tentative 
and easy to underestimate, that they should.  
For example, the Internet collective known as ‘Anonymous’, which has received a lot of attention in 
the press in the last half year, is tempting to dismiss because of the almost self-parodying rhetoric it 
employs and the capriciousness of its target selection. In the space of two years it ‘declared war’ on, 
inter alia: the music industry and its legal representatives for cracking down on file-sharing, i.e., theft 
of intellectual property; followed by the Church of Scientology ‘for the good of mankind and for our 
enjoyment’; the financial enterprises Visa, Mastercard, and PayPal, plus the governments of the 
United Kingdom and the United States, in order to punish them for the crackdown on Wikileaks 
and the persecution of its founder Julian Assange; as well as various regimes in the Middle East for 
being repressive. ‘Anonymous’ describes itself as: 
...not a single person, but rather, [it] represents the collective whole of the Internet. 
As individuals, they can be intelligent, rational, emotional and empathetic. As a mass, 
a group, they are devoid of humanity and mercy. Never before in the history of 
humanity has there once been such a morass, a terrible network of the peer-pressure 
that forces people to become one, become evil. Welcome to the soulless mass of 
blunt immorality known only as the Internet.38 
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 The nature of Anonymous’ leadership, if indeed it has any, is very unclear. There is no credible 
research done on its organization and structure; and the credibility of the few figures who have 
identified themselvesas leadership figures—such as Barrett Brown, who claims to be a ‘senior 
strategist and propagandist’—is difficult to judge.39 Nonetheless, its highly successful (and on-going) 
attack on the reputable data security and malware response company HBGary demonstrated that it 
has substantial technical capability to cause harm—that is to say, it has means to compel its enemies. 
The firm was targeted after the CEO of an associated company HBGary Federal, Aaron Barr, 
announced that his company had infiltrated Anonymous, discovered its members’ real names and 
was going to publicize them. In return, Anonymous hacked HBGary’s servers, defaced its website, 
downloaded tens of thousands of its corporate emails and posted them on the web, digitally 
harassed its CEO and other staff, and left a threatening note in its booth at the RSA security 
conference in San Francisco, which caused the cancellation of the launch announcement of a major 
new software product. As the Vice President Jim Butterworth put it, ‘They decided to follow us to a 
public place where we were to do business and make a public mockery of our company.’40  
The last exchange between HBGary’s CEO Greg Hoglund on Anonymous’ IRC channel in which 
he pleaded in vain for his e-mails to stay private lends some credence to the group’s claim for ‘blunt 
immorality’ and absence of mercy: 
<+greg> so you got my email spool too then 
… 
<@`k> greg we got everything 
<+Agamemnon> Greg, I'm curious to know if you understand what we are 
about? Do you understand why we do what we do? 
<+greg> you realize that releasing my email spool will cause millions in 
damages to HBGary? 
… 
<+Agamemnon> yes we do greg 
<@`k> greg is will be end of you :) and your company41  
Moreover, there is unmistakable evidence of a plethora of ways in which enemies may be attacked 
ranging from acts of subversion (e.g., propaganda, data theft, website defacement) and sabotage 
(e.g., denial of service, systems disruption, data loss) through to physical violence. It is true that thus far 
we have seen no instances of ‘cyber-terror’; ‘virtual’ groups like Anonymous have confined their 
activities to the virtual dimension. However, there are multiple examples of ‘real world’ social 
movements cottoning on to the power of networks to multiply their violent capacity for strategic 
effect. Al Qaeda, as has been richly described in the literature, is a superb example, having turned 
itself into what Mark Duffield has called a ‘non-territorial network enterprise’, which works in, 
through, and out of borderless, distance-killing cyberspace.42  
A key strength of al Qaeda is that the extremist community from which it draws energy lives and 
acts largely on the virtual plane; it has no territory but stretches around the world in geographically-
isolated but digitally interconnected groups which share a common cause driven by a shared sense of 
outrage. As John Mackinlay put it, ‘In these wispy, informal patterns, without territory and without 
formal command structures, they are not easily touched by the kinetic blows of a formal military 
campaign.’43 Naturally, the literature has dwelled lengthily on al Qaeda and its affiliates and imitators 
because of the spectacular violence that they employ. Violence, however, is not the be all and end all 
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 of the ability to coerce, particularly as we invest more and more value in our digital identities, threats 
to them become more potentially compelling. For instance, given a choice between a hard physical 
beating or the electronic assault he actually suffered, might HBGary’s CEO have gone for the 
former?  
The focus on al Qaeda perhaps obscures the larger phenomenon of which it is but one 
manifestation. In point of fact, there are many other networked social movements which use some 
or all of the same methods as al Qaeda—notably resource mobilization via propaganda and 
propaganda by deed, ‘flattened’ hierarchy, decentralization, and self-organization—which all depend 
on networks. Some of these networked movements, such as the environmental group Earth 
Liberation Front, use violence, though not yet on the scale or of the same viciousness as al Qaeda, 
and are similarly intent on destroying Western civilization which they regard as inimically hostile and 
destructive of the Earth’s environment. Many others use networks to enhance their ability to 
organize various forms of protest including demonstrations that may end, deliberately or 
accidentally, in violent street battles. A good example is the anti-capitalist movement/umbrella 
group ‘We are Everywhere’ which describes itself as,  
… the rise of an unprecedented global rebellion—a rebellion which is in constant 
flux, which swaps ideas and tactics across oceans, shares strategies between cultures 
and continents, gathers in swarms and dissolves, only to swarm again elsewhere. But 
this is a movement of untold stories, for those from below are not those who get to 
write history, even though we are the ones making it.44 
Thus, the question when it comes to such groups is not so much the ways and means by which they 
may behave as strategic actors, because these are already fairly clear and the trend of their likely 
developments is predictable; rather it is the ends to which their ways and means are or may be 
committed that are less clear and more worrisome. Again, it is worth starting with al Qaeda, about 
which there is relatively quite a lot known. The paradox of al Qaeda is its pairing of 21st century ways 
and means with a backward-looking end of restoring a 7th century Muslim empire, which fails to 
appeal to most Muslims who are interested in a very different promised land (as may be seen by the 
current ‘democratic’ revolutions in the Middle East) than the one with which Islamist ideologues try 
to tempt them. Similar in form, the Earth Liberation Front is a leaderless or quasi-leaderless 
movement that lacks central authority over its component cells, which act locally on their own 
initiative in accordance with the group’s overall aims. As a result the group requires a powerful and 
encompassing strategic narrative in order to mobilize adherents and guide them to actions that are 
strategically purposeful. And as with al Qaeda, the group’s ideology is not of its own making; rather 
it is a syncretic mix of beliefs formulated by more articulate others, including ‘Deep Ecology’, ‘Social 
Ecology’, and ‘Green Anarchism’ with an admixture of Neo-Pagan mysticism and anti-capitalism.45  
Moreover, the language they employ is startlingly familiar in its rhetorical structure to readers of 
Islamist rationalizations of their attacks. Consider, for example, this 11 August 2002 communiqué 
issued in response to the development of genetically modified organisms by several major 
corporations and universities: 
Their blatant disregard for the sanctity of life and its perfect Natural balance, 
indifference to strong public opposition, and the irrevocable acts of extreme violence 
they perpetrate against the Earth daily are all inexcusable, and will not be tolerated. 
IF they persist in their crimes against life, they will be met with maximum retaliation. 
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 In pursuance of justice, freedom, and equal consideration for all innocent life across 
the board, segments of this global revolutionary movement are no longer limiting 
their revolutionary potential by adhering to a flawed, inconsistent ‘non–violent’ 
ideology. While innocent life will never be harmed in any action we must undertake, 
where it is necessary, we will no longer hesitate to pick up the gun to implement 
justice, and provide the needed protection for our planet that decades of legal battles, 
pleading, protest, and economic sabotage have failed so drastically to achieve. 
The diverse efforts of this revolutionary force cannot be contained, and will only 
continue to intensify as we are brought face to face with the oppressor in inevitable, 
violent confrontation. We will stand up and fight for our lives against this iniquitous 
civilization until its reign of TERROR is forced to an end—by any means 
necessary.46 
With remarkably few changes in word choice this might be the text of a suicide bomber’s 
‘martyrdom video’. It remains to be seen whether extreme environmentalism and anti-capitalism can 
develop a plausible end state with a real chance of mobilizing a sufficiently large part of the 
population to achieve revolutionary change; or whether, as with Islamism, their eschatological 
rhetoric and murderousness will have the effect of alienating it from the population which they 
purport to represent. Without doubt, cyberspace enables such groups to take on forms that are hard 
to penetrate and to conduct attacks that are hard to defend against. At the same time, it does not 
change the fact that revolutionary groups need to do more than attack the status quo—they must 
also paint a convincing picture of a better future. It is significant, however, that as opposed to 
Islamism, which in the West appeals to a minority within a minority, environmentalism and anti-
capitalism (particularly after the banking crash of 2008 which has fuelled hatred of the financial 
sector) are viewed broadly much more positively in society.  
One of the things that make Anonymous interesting is that it is subversive in the sense of being 
disruptive of the existing order but its goals are not constructive in the way which genuinely 
revolutionary goals are thought to need to be. At present they are much more like the 19th and early 
20th century anarchists with whom many members seem to consciously identify. Whether there are 
more disciplined revolutionaries within the movement employing the dumb mass of other cheap 
‘clicktivists’ or ‘hacktivists’ as ad hoc ‘shock troops’ or not is unknown. As may be seen in the 
exchange with HBGary’s CEO Greg Hoglund, there is a distinctly rudderless fanaticism to the 
group; they clearly were not interested in accepting his surrender. When one of the participants in 
that discussion asked Hoglund ‘[do] you understand what we are about? Do you understand why we 
do what we do?’ he did not provide an answer.  
But the question is highly apposite. Why do they do what they do? The most common answer is for 
the ‘lulz’—Anonymous clearly makes it very easy for individuals to engage in high-impact but low-
cost/low-effort activism; but it is hard to see how ‘lulz’ can constitute the ‘sacred cause’ which 
revolutionary groups have thus far always required to sustain their movements over the long term. 
Anonymous’ championing of Wikileaks may be significant in this respect; it remains to be seen, 
however, whether this foray into political contest will outweigh the inherent capriciousness of the 
group—that is to say if it can adopt a coherent ideological identity. 
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 Conclusion: DIY Revolution 
Cyberspace alters much but it does not change everything. It enhances our ability as social beings to 
communicate, to collaborate, and to argue, not to mention consume—all traits as old as mankind 
itself. Connectivity has important implications for the practice of war but it does not substantially 
alter its nature as much as is commonly supposed. It does not with ‘cyberwar’ create a decisive new 
form of warfare that will reshape the international order in respect of the balance of power amongst 
states as we have come to know it. If anything it shores up the existing distribution of military power 
rather than undermining it.  
This is not an invitation to be complacent, however, because new forms of business, economic, and 
social practices, including subversives and revolutionaries, have emerged to shape and take 
advantage of connectivity. It is not that the state is irrelevant to these new forms; it is rather that the 
focus of their energies, for better or worse, is simultaneously far larger (i.e., civilizational) and much 
smaller (i.e., corporate or individual) than the position occupied by the state. Thus it begs the 
question, what does the discipline of strategy have to add? As it has been oriented for many years—
on the notions of ultima ratio regum, that power emerges from the barrel of a gun, and of states as the 
alpha and omega of discussion—perhaps not much; but in its essence as the combination of ends, 
means and ways by diverse social actors quite a lot. 
Right now, the networked social movement that has most exercised the interest of the strategic 
studies community for the last decade is a strategic misfire—unable to achieve its desired end state 
because of its inherent outlandishness and popular undesirability. There are, however, a number of 
other networked social movements which are best described as being in a state of ‘strategic latency’ 
that have received little attention. ‘Strategic latency’ is a term which some analysts have used to 
describe ‘a condition in which technologies that could provide military (or economic) advantage 
remain untapped.’47 The causes of the strategic latency of networked social movements are not 
technological: the means for them to exert power—to compel, or attempt to compel, their enemies 
to do their will—are available and growing in scale and sophistication. Nor are the causes of their 
latency to be found in their ways: various techniques ranging from disruption and sabotage, both 
real and virtual, to violent physical actions which resonate in the global mediascape, have been 
amply demonstrated and shown to be operationally effective. The cause of their latency is political: 
no networked social movements as of yet have attached existing, albeit new, ways and means to an 
end compelling enough to mobilize the masses. 
The problem for future war horizon-scanners is not the degree to which they correctly apprehend 
technological challenges; it is the degree to which they understand the human motivations behind 
the usages of that technology. In a short at the Salt Lake Ignite conference (‘a community event 
celebrating the passion and creativity of geek culture’ whose slogan is ‘Enlighten us, but make it 
quick’), Matthew Reinbold, Creative Principal of Vox Pop Design enjoined his listeners: 
When you organize your tribe and you’ve decided to tackle one of these problems 
make sure that you have a semi-permeable membrane made out of belief. That belief 
will tell you what ideas you should accept into your organization and what ideas you 
should reject. But ultimately it starts with you. You have to care. You can’t just idly 
sit back and decide that somebody else is going to solve your problems, that 
somebody else is going to come save you, that somebody else is going to be the 
champion that you’ve been waiting for; it is all up to you. The alternative is sitting in 
darkness, stumbling around victimized by boom and bust cycles. It’s imperative that 
you take action. You decide the problems that you want to solve, you decide the 
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 world that you want to make. You can keep calm and just hope that things get better 
or you can make the effort to get excited and make the world that you want. Find 
your tribe. Decide what you believe. Rally them around you.48  
As calls to arms go this is mild stuff—there is no question that Reinbold is talking about non-violent 
activism in pursuit of changes which most people would regard as normatively positive—e.g., energy 
independence. Yet the subtext here is subversive too. It begins from the premise that the existing 
authority, the government, is unable or uninterested in changing the status quo because it is enslaved 
to corporate interests which are the real enemy. It trumpets a grievance of ‘victimization by boom 
and bust’ which resonates with youth, particularly urban, educated and middle class youth whose life 
prospects have been hit hard by the global economic crisis. It implies an ‘in-group’ and an ‘out-
group’ and it ends with a rousing call to make the world what you want it to be. There is no call to 
violence—nor is any implied; however, a world of do-it-yourself revolution is one which would 
possess multiple variants amongst disparate groups embracing different ways and means to similar 
ends.  
What is unclear is the ideology that might serve to focus the abundant dissatisfaction with the status 
quo to which Reinbold is reacting. What are the ‘sunlit uplands’ towards which he imagines us 
striving? If you could identify it would you fight it or join it? The pause which you require to 
consider that question is the reason that this historical moment is strategically significant. On the 
other hand, perhaps there is no overarching ideology; instead what will emerge from the 
informational turbulence in which contemporary international politics now finds itself is a world in 
which a multitude of passionately-held identity driven causes transcend the nation-state based ones 
which have underpinned strategic thinking for generations.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 William Gibson, interviewed in No Maps for These Territories, dir. Mark Neale, 89 min (Mark Neale Productions, 2000). 
2 Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity is Near (New York: Viking, 2005).  
3 Max Weber, ‘Class, Status, Party’, in Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1948), p.180. 
4 Clay Shirky, Cognitive Surplus (London: Allen Lane, 2010), p. 37. 
5 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Marshall McLuhan in Conversation with Norman Mailer’, The Way It Is, 
broadcast 26 November 1967. 
6 A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy (London: The Stationery Office, 2010), p. 3. 
7 United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: February 2010). 
8 British Broadcasting Corporation, The Virtual Revolution, Episode 2 ‘The Enemy of the State?’, aired on BBC2 (6 
February 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00n4j0r 
9 Quoted in Michael S. Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987), p. 23. 
10 The full text of the Baldwin House of Commons speech from 10 November 1932 may be found on the ‘Airminded’ 
blog, http://airminded.org/2007/11/10/the-bomber-will-always-get-through/; Baldwin was echoing the claims of the 
Italian air power theorist Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (New York: Faber and Faber, 1942). 
11 J.F.C. Fuller, The Reformation of War (London: Hutchinson, 1923), 
http://www.archive.org/stream/reformationofwar00fulluoft/reformationofwar00fulluoft_djvu.txt, p. 150. 
12 Quoted in Sherry, p. 26. 
13 H.G. Wells, The War in the Air (1908), can be read on-line at http://www.literaturepage.com/read/wells-war-in-the-
air.html  
14 Quoted in Sherry, p. 30. 
15 Cohen, ‘The Mystique of US Air Power’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 1 (January/ February 1994), p. 109. 
Strategic Insights • October 2011 Volume 10, Special Issue 75
Betz The Mystique of "Cyberwar" and the Strategic Latency of Networked Social Movements
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See Cyberspace Operations, United States Air Force Doctrine Document 3-12 (15 July 2010), p. 10 http://www.e-
publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/afdd3-12.pdf  
17 James Adams, The Next World War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998), p. 313. 
18 Benjamin Lambeth ‘Airpower, Spacepower and Cyberpower’, Joint Force Quarterly, issue 60, 1st quarter (2011), p. 51. 
19 Richard Clarke, Cyber War (New York, HarperCollins, 2010), pp. 67-68. 
20 Clarke, p. 68. 
21 The White House, National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (Washington, DC: 2003), p. vii, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/National_Cyberspace_Strategy.pdf  
 
22 USAF, Cyberspace Operations, p. 10. 
23 William J. Broad, John Markoff and David Sanfer, ‘Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay’, New 
York Times (15 January 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html 
24 Stephen Biddle, Military Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).  
25 John Arquila and David Ronfeldt, ‘Cyberwar is Coming’ in Arquila and Ronfeldt (eds.), In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for 
Conflict in the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997), p. 23. 
26 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force (London: Allen Lane, 2005), p. 1.  
27 See Michael Mandelbaum, ‘Is Major War Obsolete?’ Survival, vol. 40, no. 4 (Winter 1998-99); Martin Van Creveld, The 
Transformation of War (New York: the Free Press, 1991); and for the long quote, Norman Angell, The Great Illusion 
(London: William Heinemann), p. 222.  
28 Hew Strachan, ‘One War, Joint Warfare’, RUSI Journal, vol. 154, no. 4 (2009), p. 22. 
29 Clarke’s three laws can be found here http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clarke's_three_laws  
30 Daniel Suarez, Daemon (London: Quercus, 2009) and Freedom™ (London: Quercus, 2010).  
31 Suarez, Freedom™, pp. 60-1. 
32 H. Perkin, The Third Revolution: Professional Elites in the Modern World (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 6, quoted in Tim 
Jordan, Cyberpower (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 135. 
33 Martin C. Libicki, Conquest in Cyberspace: National Security and Information Warfare (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), pp.236-240. Libicki also describes a third layer (semantic—made up of the meanings conveyed by 
cyberspace) as well as a fourth and uppermost layer (pragmatic) but omits it from later work, e.g. Martin C. Libicki, 
Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), pp.12-13. 
34 Daniel Bell, The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting (London: Heinemann Educational, 
1974). 
35 Jordan, p. 139 
36 John Robb, Brave New War (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2007). 
37 Daniel Suarez interview with Frank Reiger on FAZ.NET (Frankfurter Allgemeine), 1 May 2011, 
http://www.faz.net/s/Rub475F682E3FC24868A8A5276D4FB916D7/Doc~E10A1FDB910EC4F5CA99B5F4C39169
BE5~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html  
38 From the Encyclopedia Dramatica entry on Anonymous, http://encyclopediadramatica.com/Anonymous  
39 See the post by David Betz and accompanying comments by Barratt Brown and others on ‘Anonymous Spokesman 
Opens Nechayev’s Tomb, Becomes Possessed’, Kings of War (14 March 2011), 
http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2011/03/anonymous-spokesman-opens-nechaevs-tomb-becomes-possessed/  
40 Quoted by Nate Anderson in ‘Anonymous vs HB Gary: The Aftermath’, ars technica (2011), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/02/anonymous-vs-hbgary-the-aftermath.ars  
41 Ibid. 
42 Mark Duffield, ‘War as a Network Enterprise: The New Security Terrain and its Implications’, Cultural Values, vol. 6, 
nos. 1&2 (2002), p. 158. 
43 John Mackinlay, The Insurgent Archipelago (London: Hurst, 2009), p. 6. 
44 Notes from Nowhere (eds.), We are Everywhere: The Irresistible Rise of Global Anti-Capitalism (London: Verso, 2003), p. 
16. 
Strategic Insights • October 2011 Volume 10, Special Issue 76
Betz The Mystique of "Cyberwar" and the Strategic Latency of Networked Social Movements
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Sean Parson, ‘Understanding the Ideology of the Earth Liberation Front’, Green Theory & Praxis: The Journal of 
Ecopedagogy, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2008), http://greentheoryandpraxis.org/journal/index.php/journal/article/viewFile/50/47  
46 Quoted in Parson. 
47 Zachary Davis, ‘Strategic Latency and World Order’, Orbis, Vol. 55, No. 1 (Winter 2011), p. 69.  
48 Matthew Reinbold, ‘Superempowerment, Networked Tribes and the End to Business as We Know It’ Ignite 4, Salt 
Lake City (4 March 2010), http://igniteshow.com/videos/super-empowerment-networked-tribes-and-end-world-we-
know-it  
Strategic Insights • October 2011 Volume 10, Special Issue 77
Betz The Mystique of "Cyberwar" and the Strategic Latency of Networked Social Movements
